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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
TRACY-COLLINS TRUST COMPANY 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
MARIAN STORY GOELTZ, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
Appellant's Brief 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Case No. 
8476 
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Third Judicial 
District Court foreclosing a mortgage on certain real property, 
and declaring the plaintiff Tracy-Collins Trust Company to be 
subrogated to rights under a previously existing mortgage and 
ordering the real property sold first to satisfy the claim under 
the subrogation and thereafter to satisfy the subsequent mort-
gage. The appeal is by Marian Story Goeltz only, who was a 
co-signer of the previously existing mortgage, but who had no 
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relation to the subsequent mortgage and whose name was 
forged thereon, and completely without her knowledge or con-
sent. 
Tracy-Collins Trust Company, a corporation filed suit 
against the appellant and Francis B. Goeltz to foreclose a mort-
gage dated May 10, 1948, given to secure a promissory note of 
the same date, both documents purportedly signed by Francis 
B. Goeltz and Marian Story Goeltz, who at that time were hus-
band and wife. 
Defendant Francis B. Goeltz answered admitting the execu-
tion by him of the note and mortgage. Appellant answered, 
denying that she had executed such note and mortgage, deny-
ing that she received the money therefrom, and setting up as 
defenses that the note and mortgage purporting to pledge their 
joint interests in the real property, was void, that her signature 
thereon was a forgery, that she had not authorized Francis B. 
Goeltz or anyone else to sign her name; that at said time Fran-
cis B. Goeltz had no interest in the property; that Tracy-Collins 
Corporation had been negligent in handling the note and mort-
gage transaction, and that it had knowledge, or notice of facts 
divesting it of any claim as a bona fide lender. 
Thereafter, Tracy-Collins Corp. filed its Supplementary 
Complaint setting up a claim of right to subrogation under an 
earlier mortgage, asserting that in 1936 Francis B. Goeltz and 
Marian Story Goeltz had executed a mortgage which subse-
quently was owned by Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co., and 
which was paid off with a part of the proceeds of the 1948 
mortgage monies. 
2 
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Appellant Marian Story Goeltz answered the Supplemen-
tal Complaint controverting Tracy-Collins Corporation's right 
to subrogation and re-asserting defenses against the 1948 mort-
gage. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant and Francis B. Goeltz were husband and wife 
in 1936, at which time certain real property was purchased, 
and title thereto taken in their joint names. A mortgage loan 
was obtained on these premises October 27, 1936 (Ex. 22-P and 
23-P). Appellant sought to introduce evidence in the trial court 
establishing the fact that she owned substantially the entire in-
terest in the real property, but upon refusal of the court to 
allow this testimony, made an offer of proof to that effect. (R. 
153, 154,155). 
Subsequently to 1936, Marian Story Goeltz and Francis B. 
Goeltz were divorced, and the real property in question was 
awarded to her in that proceedings. However, prior to the 
divorce, Francis B. Goeltz had, in 1948 mortgaged the property 
to Tracy-Collins Corp. under the following circumstances. 
Goeltz had applied for a mortgage loan, which had appar-
ently been approved, the papers were prepared, and Mr. Hena-
ger notified Mr. Goeltz to this effect. (R. 104, 114). There-
after, Goeltz came into the bank and asked permission to take 
the papers out for Mrs. Goeltz to sign. (R. 114, R. 115). He 
was informed that this was irregular, that Mr. Henager had 
no authority to allow this, and the matter was referred to Mr. 
3 
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Benedict, a bank officer. Mr. Benedict allowed Mr. Goeltz to 
take the papers out for signature on the representation by Mr. 
Goeltz that Mrs. Goeltz was ill and could not come in to sign 
them. (R. 168, 172, 173). 
The circumstances under which the 1948 mortgage was 
made are very material to the issues raised on appeal, and 
bear emphasis at this point. Henager testified that he told 
Goeltz that to allow the papers out was contrary to their bank-
ing practice and rules, (R. 168, 114) and characterized the 
allowance of this in this case as "very unusual" (R. 104,5), and 
that they had practically no cases like it. Mr. Benedict, a bank 
officer, who authorized the loan papers to be taken out to be 
signed, testified that it was unusual to allow mortgage loan 
papers out (R. 168) that Mr. Goeltz made the request stating 
that Mrs. Goeltz was not feeling well, and that the very reason 
for not allowing mortgage loan papers out was to prevent just 
such occurance as here occurred (R. 173, 174), and that allow-
ing papers out was contrary to their banking practice (R. 173.) 
Mr. Benedict also testified that he knew Mrs. Goeltz very well, 
and that he could easily have contacted her and thus avoided 
this whole thing. (R. 173.) 
The 1948 mortgage and mortgage note were signed by 
Francis B. Goeltz, and purportedly were signed by Mrs. Goeltz, 
and a check issued by Tracy-Collins Corp. to Francis Boydell 
Goeltz in the sum of $3,851.60. The entire mortgage was in the 
sum of $7,100, but the balance of $3,224.41 was remitted to 
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company to pay off the existing 
real estate mortgage as of that time. Tracy-Collins Corp. had no 
4 
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interest in the existing mortgage other than as agent to receivt 
payments, and admittedly had no recourse liability or othei 
wise on that mortgage. 
Marian Story Goeltz first discovered the existence of the 
new mortgage loan in 1951, and went immediately to the bank 
concerning the same, and at that time told Mr. Benedict that 
she had not signed the same, and exhibited documents to him 
bearing her signature for comparison, and obtained his acknow-
ledgement that the signature did not appear to be the same. (R. 
150). 
An expert testifying at the trial confirmed Mr. Benedict's 
opinion that the signatures were not the same, (R. 128-133) and 
indicated that a superficial examination convinced him of this 
fact. 
The documentary proof asserted in support of the 1948 
mortgage and note, including those documents reveal clearly 
that the note and mortgage purport to be a joint note and 
mortgage. (Ex. 9-P, 10-P). A supplemental agreement accom-
panying these documents gives further support to this fact. (Ex. 
11-P). Nowhere either in the documentary proof or in the 
oral evidence is there any suggestion that a separation of the 
interests in the property was ever contemplated, or that any-
thing less than the entire property was considered as having 
been pledged, or that this was anything other than a joint loan. 
Nonetheless, the Findings of Fact, particularly Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 
and 5, purposely ignore this fact and lend credence to the con-
clusions No. 3, 4, and 7(b) and the judgment following there-
from. 
5 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. The 1948 Mortgage was a void mortgage, and Plaintiff can-
not gain any rights thereunder. 
II. The plaintiff was guilty of culpable negligence and not en-
titled to any recovery under the 1948 mortgage. 
III. The claim of the plaintiff under the 1948 mortgage is subject 
to the true rights in ownership of said property as they actu-
ally existed in Marian Story Goeftz. 
IV. The trial court erred in refusing to allow the appellant to 
establish that the bank was put on notice in the 1948 mort-
gage loan application by the condition of the defendant 
Francis B. Goeltz physically and mentally at that time. 
V. The bank had possession of information from which it could 
have determined that the purported signatures of Marian 
Story Goeltz on the 1948 note and mortgage and supple-
mental agreement were forgeries, and was bound by what it 
should have discovered in this respect. 
VI. The plaintiff is not entitled to be subrogated to the original 
mortgage. 
VII. The trial court erred in its judgment with respect to the method 
and order of sale of the property subject to foreclosure. 
6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Point I. 
The 1948 mortgage was a void mortgage, and 
Plaintiff cannot gain any rights thereunder. 
As indicated in the statement of facts heretofore, there is 
absolutely no doubt but that Mrs. Goeltz signature was forged 
on the note and mortgage, and on the supplemental agreement. 
The entire transaction purported to be the mortgage of 4 
jointly owned property by the joint owners thereof, and to be a 
pledge of the entire interest of both parties therein, in exchange 
for a loan to them both. (Ex. 9P, 10P and I I P ) . No suggestion 
exists anywhere in the transaction that less than this was in-
tended, or bargained for, and in fact the entire record is to the 
contrary. In fact, the discussion acknowledged by Henager and 
Benedict (R. 104-114, 168-173) indicates clearly that the loan 
was conditional upon Mrs. Goeltz signature being obtained, 
otherwise no necessity for any of the subsequent by-play existed. 
In this respect, the case falls within the doctrine of Stock-
yards National Bank, etc. v. Bragg, 67 Utah 60, 245 P. <$&&, iU 
wherein it was held that a mortgage conditioned upon certain 
minors also giving a valid mortgage was invalid en toto when 
the mortgage of the minor's interest failed of validity. 
Certainly in the instant case, the Tracy-Collins Corp. did 
not intend to grant a mortgage on Goeltz interest in the pro-
perty alone, and in fact, had such a suggestion been made to 
them, or had they been bargaining for such a transaction, they 
undoubtedly would have viewed the entire transaction more 
7 
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closely than they did. Finding No. 24 is to the effect that they 
thought they were bargaining for the whole security, and all 
of the interest in the property. 
To give them the benefit of a severance of the joint interest, 
and findings that Geoltz pledged his interest in that property, 
under the circumstances here involved, is to allow them to now 
assert in the findings something absolutely foreign to their own 
handling of the transaction and something absolutely contrary 
% to fact, and findings No. 3, 4, 5 and 20 in this respect are con-
trary to the evidence and cannot be sustained, nor can the con-
clusions stemming therefrom, nor the judgment. 
An Annotation at 151 ALR 414 (also noting earlier anno-
tations) collects numerous cases dealing with the situation 
where a mortgage is void because of the forgery of a signature 
of the wife as here involved, and dealing specifically with the 
question of right of subrogation in such circumstances. 
In the case of Zinkeison v. Lewis, 63 Kan. 590, 66 Pac. 
644, a similar factual picture to the one here involved was pre-
sented. In that case, a new mortgage had been obtained by the 
husband and to pay off a prior mortgage. The wife did not sign 
the mortgage, and the husband admitted having signed his 
wife's name without authority. The evidence indicated that 
the wife knew of the forgery shortly thereafter, but said noth-
ing about it, contrary to the facts in the present case. The court 
ruled the second mortgage invalid, but said that the lending 
agency was subrogated to the rights of the first mortgage which 
was satisfied with the monies from the second mortgage loan. 
8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the case Serial Building Loan & Savings Inst. v. Ehr-
hardt 95 N. J. Eq. 607, 124 A. 56, the court held that where the 
husband had forged the wife's signature to a mortgage that was 
partly used to pay off an earlier mortgage held by the same 
people, that the second mortgage was void and invalid because 
of the forgery, but that the plaintiff was entitled to be subro-
gated to the rights as they existed under the discharged first 
mortgage. 
To the same effect see Davies v. Pugh 81 Ark. 253, 99 S.W. 
78, wherein the wife's signature was forged by the husband and 
the court held the mortgage void in its entirety, but held that 
the plaintiff was entitled to subrogation to an earlier valid mort-
gage-
Also, in the case of Carey v. Hart, 208 Ala. 316, 94 So. 
298, the wife's signature was forged and the court held the 
mortgage invalid. 
In the case of Home Owners Loan Corp. v. Papara, 241 
Wis. 112, 3 N. W. 2d 730, the names of certain co-tenants were 
forged to a note and mortgage purporting to mortgage the entire 
interest in the property, and the proceeds used to pay off an 
existing mortgage. The court held the mortgage to be invalid 
because of the forgery, but allowed the plaintiff to be subrogated 
to the rights existing under a prior valid mortgage. 
Many, many other cases might be cited, including the fol-
lowing, holding that the new mortgage is invalid under circum-
stances where a forgery of one of the purported signatures 
exists, and holding that the remedy if one exists to the plaintiff 
9 
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as to the real property involved, is in subrogation to a prior 
existing mortgage. Kusky v. Staley, 138 Kan. 869, 28 P. 2d 728; 
Kaminskas v. Cepanskis, 369 111. 566, 17 N. E. 2d 558; Hall v. 
Marshall, 139 Mich 123, 102 N. W. 658; and Krost v. Kleg 
(Mo.) 46 S. W. 2d 866. 
In fact, the existence of the doctrine of subrogation in the 
law of mortgages is predicated to a considerable extent upon the 
theory that because of just such circumstances as a forgery, the 
interest bargained to be pledged has failed, and the mortgage 
void, and hence a remedy of subrogation made necessary in a 
proper case. 
Appellant re-asserts that the 1948 mortgage in the present 
instance failed completed and was void by reason of the fact 
that it purported to be a pledge of the entire property, condition-
ed upon the signatures of both parties, and that hence no rights 
can exist in favor of the plaintiff against the property itself 
arising out of the mortgage, that the rights of the bank, if any, 
lie in subrogation, and that in this instance as will hereinafter 
be made evident, no right to subrogation existed. 
Point I I 
The plaintiff was guilty of culpable negligence and 
not entitled to any recovery under the 1948 mortgage. 
Here appellant relies upon the testimony of Mr. Henager 
and Mr. Benedict as indicated in the statement of facts to the 
effect that it was a very unusual thing to allow a mortgage and 
10 
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mortgage note out of the office to be signed, that it was contrary 
to their banking practice and contrary to instructions, and that 
the rule and banking practice was designed to prevent the hap-
pening of just such an occurrance as this. 
It seems highly singular that a bank can violate its own 
rules, set up by reason of experience, as being necessary to pre-
vent the happening of such things as this, and then to allow 
them to hurt a completely innocent party, when by violation of 
those practices they have allowed the happening of this unfortu-
nate transaction. 
Certainly good practice would dictate that if a violation is 
to occur, then some other safeguard should be inserted. In this 
instance the one which could and should have occurred is obvi-
ous from the testimony of Mr. Benedict who admitted some-
what ruefully that he knew Mrs. Goeltz well, and could easily 
have telephoned her and prevented the whole damage from 
occurring. 
In view of the fact that holding to their rule would 
have brought them knowledge of the true fact with reference to 
the ownership of the property (the subject of an offer of proof), 
since Mrs. Goeltz had she been brought to the bank by Mr. 
Goeltz would certainly have indicated the true ownership of the 
property to them, or if she had in any way been contacted about 
the proposed loan when a violation of bank rules was being 
authorized, she would have advised them of the true ownership 
of the real property, it appears completely justifiable from her 
point of view that the bank be made to suffer for their own 
11 
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banking practice violation, rather than her, and that the 1948 
mortgage be ruled to be completely subject to her true owner-
ship interest in the property, as will more particularly appear 
at a subsequent point herein. 
Point I I I 
The claim of the plaintiff under the 1948 mortgage 
is subject to the true rights in ownership of said property 
as they actually existed in Marian Story Goeltz. 
It is true, that the property here involved was held in joint 
tenancy for record purposes at the time the 1948 mortgage was 
entered into by Tracy-Collins Corp. and Francis B. Goeltz, and 
purportedly by appellant, and appellant is not unmindful of 
the cases holding that as to third persons the record is conclusive. 
However, as to parties who have knowledge, or notice of 
facts putting them on a duty of inquiry, certainly the true facts 
are admissable as a defense to the foreclosure against the pro-
perty involved where the claim is ultimately made, as here, that 
Mr. Goeltz pledged his interest in the real property. It becomes 
very material then to determine what that interest, was, if any. 
Appellant made an offer of proof as to what that interest 
was, after the trial court had refused to allow appellant to tes-
tify concerning that interest. 
It is submitted that the trial court erred in refusing to allow 
the appellant to establish the interest of the appellant involved 
12 
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in the foreclosure and the interest of Francis B. Goeltz in that 
property. 
It is further asserted, that in the circumstances here in-
volved the appellant had the right to submit evidence that the 
property was her sole and separate estate, and paid for her out 
of her sole and separate property. 41 C.J.S. Sec. 251, p. 735; 
Wallace v. Riley, 23 Cal. App. 2d 669, 74 P. 2d 800; Long v. 
Duprey, 52 N.Y. 2d 93; Moskowitz v. Marrow 251 N.Y. 380, 
167N.E.506. 
Point IV 
The trial court erred in refusing to allow the appel-
lant to establish that the bank was put on notice in the 
1948 mortgage loan application by the condition of the 
defendant Francis B. Goeltz physically and mentally at 
that time. 
In this respect appellant relies upon the offer of proof 
made at the trial wherein counsel offered to prove (R. 154, 155, 
158, 159) that Mr. Benedict a good friend of Goeltz knew of the 
fact that Goeltz was drinking heavily and not paying attention 
to business, that he was using all of his funds for drinking and 
allied purposes, that he was under the influence of liquor prac-
tically continually during the period when this 1948 mortgage 
was entered into, and that the bank through their agent knew 
of these facts, and that it consequently was an additional fact 
which should have put them on guard. 
The principle is clear, that "whatever is notice enough to 
13 
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excite attention and put the party on his guard, and calling for 
inquiry is notice of everything to which such inquiry might have 
led." Meagher v. Dean (Utah) 91 P. 2d 454; O'Reilly v. 
McLean 84 Utah 551, 37 P. 2d 770. 
Taken alone, it may be that the facts as outlined in the 
offer of proof with respect to drunken condition of Goeltz would 
not be enough to tip the scales in favor of appellant's point of 
view, although we earnestly believe that it would be sufficient 
However, this condition, when added to the "very unusual" 
occurrance of asking permission to take a mortgage note and 
mortgage out to be signed by one of the parties, certainly would 
appear to be sufficient to excite the person of ordinary observa-
tion powers to the extent that an inquiry would and should be 
made. The inquiry would have revealed that Goeltz had no 
right to mortgage, that Mrs. Goeltz was the owner of the pro-
perty, and that any purported signature of hers would be a 
forgery. 
Point V 
The bank had possession of information from which 
it could have determined that the purported signatures 
of Marian Story Goeltz on the 1948 note and mortgage 
and supplemental agreement were forgeries/ and was 
bound by what it should have discovered in this respect. 
Counsel for appellant made demand upon plaintiff for the 
production of the original Mortgagors' statement in relation to 
the 1936 mortgage. This was produced by the plaintiff from its 
records, (R. 96, 118, 122) at the time of the trial. (Ex. 25-D R.) 
14 
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This document bears the true signature of Marian Story Goeltz. 
Any examination whatsoever of the signature on that document 
and comparison of it with the poor attempt made in the 1948 
note, mortgage and supplemental agreement to simulate her 
signature, would have at once indicated to the bank that a for-
gery was being attempted upon them. 
In the face of the banking practice violated and the pur-
pose of that practice to prevent such things, it seems inconceiv-
able that the bank with a true signature in its possession and 
wherein the transaction in which document with the true sig-
nature on was being involved, would not have checked the sig-
nature at least perfunctorily as a cautionary measure. Any ex-
amination whatsoever, no matter how perfunctory would have 
at once revealed the forgery. 
Appellant asserts that certainly the duty of the bank under 
the circumstances here involved extended to an examination of 
its owrn files and documents concerning this property, and that 
the bank should be bound by the knowledge it could have ob-
tained from its own file. In this respect, the bank certainly had 
as much information available to it as was available to the bank 
in the case Fidelity Trust & Savings Co. v. Williams (111.) 1 N.E. 
2d 739, where the husband got property into his wife's name by 
a series of transactions and then conveyed over to a third party 
and a mortgage obtained thereon with knowledge to the bank 
that the transfer to the third party was merely an accommoda-
tion. The court said: 
"We know of no law to the effect that because a 
woman holds title to property her husband may make 
15 
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application for a loan and receive the benefit therefrom 
without notice to her of his intention to do so. This also 
applies to the bank, as it had knowledge that Sadie 
Schiavoni had an interest in this property and that title 
was conveyed as it admits to Williams as a dummy, and 
it should have made an investigation to determine what 
right Sadie Schiavoni had in and to the property. 
."From the record it is apparent that a fraud was 
perpetrated by Michael Schiavoni but it is sufficient to 
say that this fraud would have been discovered if an 
investigation had been made by the Bank and they had 
learned the right she claimed in the property in ques-
tion." 
Point VI 
The plaintiff is not entitled to be subrogated to the 
original mortgage. 
As heretofore pointed out a Point I, the remedy of the 
plaintiff where a mortgage is void by reason of forgery, is that 
of subrogation. However, it is also necessary that facts justify-
ing subrogation be present before that doctrine can be applied 
to give the plaintiff relief. In the present instance those facts do 
not exist. 
This court has, in the case of Martin v. Hickenlooper. 
(Utah) 59 P. 2d 1139, set out the requirements for subrogation 
in Utah. This court in that case went into the doctrine of sub-
rogation very thoroughly differentiating between "legal subro-
gation" and "conventional subrogation": 
"When a lender in no way related to the property 
and not required to protect any interest advances money 
16 
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to pay off the lien legal subrogation' does not exist, 
and at most 'conventional subrogation' exists. In order 
to constitute 'conventional subrogation' there must be 
an agreement, express or implied, that the lender whose 
money pays off a lien will have some status as to the 
lien his money releases to the extent of the debt secured 
by that lien." 
In the present case, the bank admittedly had no interest to 
protect. They had no interest whatsoever in the prior existing 
mortgage which was owned by Pacific Mutual Life Insurance 
Company. Hence, no "legal subrogation" could exist. 
Did "conventional subrogation" exist in this instance then? 
Did a state of facts exist whereby an agreement, express or im-
plied can be made out that the lender be subrogated to a status 
with reference to the lien which his money pays off? The 
plaintiff introduced absolutely no evidence of any express agree-
ment. It is apparent from the record that the plaintiff was rely-
ing on the new mortgage only, and even in its initial pleading 
the plaintiff asserted reliance on the new mortgage only. 
On the other hand, very cogent reasons exist why no "con-
ventional subrogation" can arise based upon an implied agree-
ment of the parties to subrogate the plaintiff to the mortgage 
the money was partially used to pay off. 
First, an illegal act intervenes between her and any implied 
agreement to allow the bank to be subrogated, that is, a forgery 
of her signature to the subsequent documents out of which the 
subrogation must arise. To find that she impliedly consented 
to subrogation under such circumstances would be to find that 
she consented in the face of the fact that she had no knowledge 
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whatsoever of the signing of the new mortgage. Certainly the 
law of subrogation in Utah could not go so far as to find that 
the appellant impliedly consented to an act which she did not 
know and has fought desperately against since she became 
aware of it. Certainly it cannot be said that from the circum-
stances here it can be "implied that it was the intention of the 
parties that the person making the advance was to have security 
of equal dignity and position to that discharged," Martin v. 
Hickenlooper supra., in the face of the fact that appellant was 
not a party to the new mortgage except by virtue of forgeries. 
Yet, in the face of the Martin v. Hickenlooper case and the facts 
as they concededly exist (Finding No. 26, the court found that 
Tracy-Collins Corp. was entitled to be subrogated and the ori-
ginal mortgage foreclosed as against the interests of both Francis 
B. Goeltz and Marian Story Goeltz. 
Second, the bank was guilty of culpable negligence in this 
new mortgage transaction, and hence not entitled to rely upon 
the doctrine of subrogation. 
The case of Martin v. Hickenlooper, supra, holds, and cites 
numerous other authorities so holding, to the effect that one who 
is otherwise entitled to be subrogated, loses that right if culpably 
negligent. See also: McColIam v. Lark, 187 Ga. 292, 200 S.E. 
276; Wilton v. Gibson 38 S.E. 379. 
Without repeating the evidence as heretofore set forth, ap-
pellant respectfully refers the court to the. Statement of Facts, 
Point II, Point III, Point IV and Point V herein, wherein those 
facts are alluded to, together with the information which would 
have been discoverable had inquiry been made. 
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It is earnestly submitted that the bank (1) had information 
in its own files which would have indicated to them the exis-
tence of the forgery, and were negligent in failing to use it; (2) 
was negligent in allowing the documents out to be signed in vio-
lation of its own rules without taking additional precaution to 
supplant that rule, particularly here where the party to be 
contacted was well known to the bank official authorizing the 
rule infraction; (3) had information through its agent Bene-
dict of the condition of Goeltz, physical and mental, sufficient to 
put the bank on a duty of inquiry in view of the unusual request 
made of it; (4) acted negligently in making the check payable 
to Goeltz alone on a joint loan thus enabling him to complete 
the mortgage transaction without ever giving notice to Mrs. 
Goeltz thereof; that these facts combined certainly are sufficient 
to establish the existence of culpable negligence in the instance 
case sufficient to defeat any subrogation whatsoever. 
To allow the bank to be subrogated to the original mortgage 
and foreclose it under these circumstances would be the equiv-
alent of saying that no matter how negligent or irresponsible a 
bank is or may be, it will be protected, even against a totally 
innocent party who is the one ultimately to be injured by the 
carelessness of the bank. 
It is earnestly submitted that plaintiff has shown absolutely 
no right to subrogation in this case, and that the trial court erred 
in finding that it was entitled to subrogation and in the conclu-
sions and judgment which follows therefrom. 
Appellant also asserts that Finding No. 28 finds no support 
in the evidence. Appellant does not controvert the fact that the 
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note and mortgage of 1936 was valid and binding prior to the 
1948 note and mortgage, but certainly has not and does not 
admit the present validity or existence of either the 1936 note or 
mortgage which this finding apparently determines. In this 
respect also, the conclusions and judgment are not sustainable. 
Point VII 
The trial court erred in its judgment with respect to 
the method and order of sale of the property subject to 
foreclosure. 
The trial court by its judgment attempts to set out the 
order of sale, the method of sale, and instruct the sheriff in the 
method whereby the sale is to be conducted. In doing so, the 
trial court erred in several respects, prejudicial to the appel-
lant. 
At page 3 of the Judgment, the court orders that the Sheriff 
sell at public auction the interests of Marian Story Goeltz and 
Francis Boydell Goeltz as owned by them on October 27, 1936. 
Then follows instructions to the Sheriff to the effect that the 
sale ox this interest in the property is to be sold first in time, 
(par. 1, page 3) (R. 197), to satisfy the judgment against both, 
and in par. 5, page 4, orders any surplus paid into court to abide 
the order of the court. 
(A) 
The first error in this procedure and instructions is that it 
appears to recognize some right in Francis Boydell Goeltz to 
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the monies involved in the sale of his purported interest. Both 
plaintiff and defendant introduced evidence establishing that 
Francis B. Goetlz had conveyed his interest in the property to 
Marian Story Goeltz (Ex. 7 P and 8 P) yet the judgment seems 
to give credence to the idea that some redemption right or other-
wise might exist in Francs B. Goeltz. This inference seems to 
be heightened by the 2nd unnumbered paragraph of the judg-
ment at page 5 thereof (R. 199) wherein it is stated "that the 
aforesaid defendants and each of them, be forever barred and 
foreclosed of and from all equity of redemption and claim of, 
and in and to said mortgaged premises and every part and par-
cel thereof from and after the delivery of said Sheriff's deed. 
Regardless of whether this is a sale of the interests of these 
parties as of 1936, or not, the only party with redemption rights 
as between Francis B. Goeltz and Marian Story Goeltz is the 
party who holds the fee title as of the present time as between 
these two parties, and the judgment of the court purports, with-
out a shred of evidence to sustain it, and in fact, in the face of 
uncontroverted evidence to the contrary, to allow Francis B. 
Goeltz redemption rights in the property. This is clearly erron-
eous, yet potentially sets the stage for another lawsuit to deter-
mine the lack of redemption rights in Francis B. Goeltz. 
(B) 
It also ties up in court money from the sale which clearly 
belongs to Marian Story Goeltz under the facts of the case with 
respect to property ownership, and in this respect also the judg-
ment is erroneous. 
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( Q 
Second, the judgment is erroneous in that it purports at 
page 6, first unnumbered paragraph (R. 200) to authorize the 
granting of a personal judgment against Marian Story Goeltz 
for a deficiency if one should occur. 
This illustrates the error the trial court made when it 
ruled that plaintiff was subrogated to rights under the 1936 
mortgage. It gives the plaintiff a personal right against the ap-
pellant based upon subrogation, where the 1948 mortgage was 
invalid and void, rather than just against the property. This 
would appear to give the plaintiff a better remedy than it could 
have against Francis B. Goeltz on the 1948 mortgage, since it 
has the effect of rendering Mrs. Goeltz personally liable for 
monies he received because of his defalcation, and assessing 
more against her personally than can be recovered against the 
property. This does not subrogate the plaintiff merely to the 
prior lien, but gives it the right to a personal judgment as well. 
It is submitted that the trial court erred in granting the 
plaintiff the right to a personal judgment against the appellant 
for any deficiency. 
(D) 
Third, the trial court erred in determining that the joint 
interests of the parties should be sold first to satisfy the subro-
gated claim against their joint interests, and thereafter ordering 
that the property be sold a second time to dispose of the interest 
of Francis Boy dell Goeltz being an undivided 1/2 interest in 
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the property owned by him on May 10, 1948. (Page 6 of 
judgment (R. 200). 
Francis B. Goeltz, if he had any interest in the property at 
all, had only one interest in the property. He did not have a 
joint interest with Marian Story Goeltz and also an undivided 
one-half interest in the property which can be sold separately, 
and a second time. If Francis B. Goeltz interest is the property, 
assuming the existence of an interest, is sold at all, it must pass 
entirely by and under the sale of the joint interest of the parties 
as of 1936. If a purchaser buys the property it must necessarily 
be that the purchaser buys the entire interest in the property, 
that is, the joint interest of the parties. By inserting another 
judgment foreclosing the Francis B. Goeltz interest in the pro-
perty at a subsequent date, the court has succeeded in making it 
highly questionable that a sale under the first sale will produce 
any substantial revenue, and has further clouded the property 
ownership to the extent that it will require additional litigation 
should Marian Story Goeltz exercise her right of redemption in 
the first instance, to determine whether the purchaser at the 
second sale has any rights whatsoever in the property. 
Marian Story Goeltz has the right to exercise her own and 
individual redemption rights in and to this property upon the 
sale of the joint interest therein. Yet the court by making the 
judgment as it has, has for all purposes rendered it impossible 
for her to exercise those rights unimpaired by serious legal ques-
tions. 
At page 8 of the judgment unnumbered paragraph 2, (R. 
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202) the court repeats the error pointed out in subparagraph 
(A) above with respect to redemption rights. 
It is earnestly submitted that the Judgment of the court is 
so erroneous and so lacking in basic substantiation as to be com-
pletely improper, that the judgment impairs severely rights of 
the appellant in the respects pointed out above, and thrusts her 
into prolong litigation with respect to protection of her interests 
in this property, and without any justification whatsoever in so 
doing, and that basic fairness and justice dictates that the judg-
ment should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
It is earnestly submitted and urged that the facts and cir-
cumstances involved in the case here at bar are such that the 
Tracy-Collins Corporation should not be allowed to step in and 
deprive the appellant of her home under the foreclosure pro-
ceedings, and that the trial court erred in the exercise of equi-
table powers in so decreeing. Further, that the Bank by reason 
of its own actions made possible the harm which was done, and 
should not be allowed to make an innocent party suffer. 
It is further respectfully urged that the trial court decided 
the question of subrogation contrary to existing Utah law. 
Appellant earnestly presses for a reversal of the judgment 
of the trial court on the basis of the errors committed by that 
court. 
Respectfully submitted 
DEAN W. SHEFFIELD 
Attorney for Appellant 
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